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In The

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
In the Matter of the Estate of

ALEXIS B.

Case No.

MALAN~

Deceased.

9076

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT,
ELFREDA A. MALAN

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Respondent agrees generally with the Appellant~"s Statement of Facts; however, the deeds referred to therein were
delivered by the grantor to the grantor~"s son, and were by
him causd to be recorded. Further, the widowl' not the es·
tate, cIaimed the exclusion of $12~583. 33 which represents
one-third of the value of the real property described in the
deeds. The question on appeal is whether the widow properly claimed an exclusion of one- third of the value of the
real property described in deeds for her statutory dower in
said real property in determining inheritance tax liability
incident to the death of her husband. Whether said deeds
were made or not made, in contemplation of death was not
an issue in the case (R. 5)+
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STATE1iENT OF POINTS
POINT I

TE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DETERMINING THE INHERITANCE TAX TO BE THE SUM OF
$702.42~

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DETERMIN-

IN'G THE INHERITANCE TAX TO BE THE SUM
OF $702.42.

The point above is the ultimate conclusion Respondent
seeks this Court to reach. The sinews of the case itself will
be dealt with by the Respondent in her brief.
Firstly~

the wife's interest in her husband's real prop-

erty:
'7 4-4-3+ Wife's interest in bus band's real property~
One-tmrd in value of all the legal or equitable estates
1

in real property possessed by the husband at

any time

during the marriage~ to which the wife has made no
relinquishment of her rightsl' shall be set apart as
her property in fee simple, if she survives him; * * •
Property distributed under the provisions of this section shall be free from all debts of the decedent ex·
cept those secured by liens for work or labor done or
material furnished exclusively for the improvement
of the same, and except those created for the purchase
thereof~ and for taxes levied thereon+ * * *~ J
(Emphasis added+)

What then was the effect of the deeds made by decedent,
his wife not having joined with him? It is thought that the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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effect is a transfer of all of the husband's

right~

title and
interest in the property conveyed, and not more than this .
It is not a conveyance of the wife's statutory interest in the
property.
This court in the case o£ Cardon v Harper et al., 151 Pac.
2d 99, decided in 1944t in an appeal from a judgment wherein certain real property of a husband, and the whole thereof
was adjudged and decreed to be a part of such husband's
bankrupt estate and to be administered by the trustee, in
considering the wife's interest in husband's real property~
says respecting such judgment:
l

''Taken literally, the deere e as it now stands in
effect operates to divest the wife of the bankrupt,
Louise C. Harper, of her contingent one- third interest
in the land which she acquired by law~ ownership of
which had nothing whatsoev-er to do with the fraud.
The decree could properly operate only to rescind the
transfer of whatever title the husband conveyed to
his \\life+ Without relinquishment on her part of her
interest, the trustee in bankruptcy, like the purchaser
at execution sale, could acquire only the title and
interest which the husband had the legal righitO
convey~

~'Except

as to the family homestead, 10 1-1. .1,
U.C.A., 1943, gives a married man a right to devise
away without the consent or relinquishment by the

wife of her interest, two-thirds in value of each parcel
of real estate, legal or equitable, which he owns. The
other one- third in value vests in his wife free from
his debts if she survives him and she has not theretofore relinquished her interest. 101-4-3~ U.C.A~ 1943.
See In Re Reynolds"' EstateJ 90 Utah 415~ 62 Pac~ 2d
270.
uThe purchaser at execution sale and the purchaser at bankru pte y sale of the rightt title, equity
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and interest of the husband in bankruptcy can acquire
no greater rights in the property than the husband
acting withotit the \Vritten concurrence Of the wife
could convey. The decree setting aside Harper)s deed
to his wife as fraudulent should operate so as to
cancel the deed and leave the title as it was before

such deed was executed.

''The decree of the lower court is modified so
that the operational effect thereof is to cancel said
deed and bill of sale from Thomas R+ Harper to his
wife, without disturbing the contingent one-third interest of his wife in the described land."
(Emphasis added.)
While the Malan case has no mortgage involvement,
such as was in the case of In Re Reynolds' Estate:~ Zion's
Savings Bank & Trust Co. v State Tax Commission~ 62 Pacr
2d 270~ decided in 1936~ the case, nevertheless~ contains
language expressing an interpretation of a wife~s interest.
The Court deciding in that case that the 'Wi.dow~s dower is
unaffected by mortgages in which she joined with her husband where there was no need because of the solvent condition of the estate to use the dower interest in their satisfac·
tion; and deciding that it was proper for the one-third in..
terest in value of the real property without consideration of
any mortgage lien to be deducted in reference to inheritance
tax determination) and on such no liability for inheritance
taxes accrued. rrhe Court says~

The 'Wi.fe~s interest has some of the aspects of
joint tenancy in one-third of the real estate. In the
1

'

common law joint tenancy~ each owned every bit of
the whole. One who died simply fell away from the
title. The husband by predeceasing her does not ef·
fectuate a passage of title of her one . third, but only
recedes frorn the interest she hadt at the same time
maturing it.~J
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Next comes the provisions of the inheritance tax law
which we examine to see whether or not it provides for inheritance taxation on a wife~s interest in her husband~s real
property~

Section 59-12-3, Co de Annotated, 1953 1 pertinently provides:

''Gross estate how determined-* * *.-The value
of the gross estate of a decedent shall be determined
by including the value at the time of his death, * * $
of all property, real or personal~ within the jurisclic..
tio n of thls state, and any interest therein~ whether
tangible or intangible~ which shall pass to any person,
in trust or otherwise~ by testamentary disposition or
by law of inheritance or succession of this or any
other state or county, or by deed~ grant~ bargain,
sale or gift made in contemplation of the death of the
grantor, vendor or donor~ or intended to take effect
in possession or enjoyment at or after his death. * * *. ''
(Emphasis added.)
Nowhere in Chapter 12, dealing with inheritance
there a provision for the exc1us ion of dower.

That dower is

tax~

is

excludable~

however, has not ever been
questioned. The point being that the dower interest is not
considered in the inheritance tax provisions as ever includable in the ascertainment of the gross estate. The custom
and the practice, however, seem to be to include the dower
interest in the appraisement of real property and to exclude
the value of the dower interest on the form and in the manner provided by the State Tax Commission (R. 11).
It is) therefore, apparent that the dower interest of a
wife is not property ''which shall pass•' in the intendment
of the inheritance tax provisions.

Now to the

cases~

excerpts therefrom, and analysis.
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In the case of In Re Bullen's Estate_! 47 Ut. 96~ 151 Pac.
533, decided in 1915, the question was, uls the widow~s onethird interest in her husband~s real property subject to the
inheritance tax?n The then statutory provision under Camp.
La\vs~ 1907, paragraph 2826, is substantially similar to the
provisions of 7 4·4-3, U ~ C.A., 1953, appearing above. The
then pertinent statutory provisions of Comp. Laws 1907~
paragraph 12 20xt is substantially similar to the pertinent
correlative provisions of 59· 12-3 ~ U. C .A.~ 195 3~ appearing
above.

The Court then states:
''What the wife receives under Section 2826--one·
third in fee simple of all the legal and equitable
estate in real property possessed by the husband during coverture, and not relinquished by her - she
receives, not as an heir of her husband~ but in her
own right~ something which belongs to her absolutely,
and of which she could not have been deprived by
\Vill Or by any other VOlUntary acto£ her husband
without her consent. Under that section~ she is not an
heir within the meaning of our intestate or succession statutes.,~

And the Court further states:

* * the

interest, under section 2826, does
not pass by the intestate laws, or, as called in the
inheritance tax act! statutes of inheritance * ~ *.tj
'~*

wife~s

And:

''So beret while under our statute the 'Wife does not
take as a survivor of community property, sbe never·
theless takes her one-third interest in the husbandjs
real estate in fee simple~ just as absolute and as much
in her own right as does the wife take her one-half
in community property. In neither instance can she
be deprived of that right by will~ or by any other
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voluntary act of her husband without her consent~
and in neither is her interest awarded or acquired
by succession, descent~ or inheritance. Succession, as
defined by the statute, iis the coming in of another
to take the property of one who dies without disposing of it by will.~ That implies that property acquired by succession may be disposed of by will. But
the property which the wife takes under section 2826
may not be disposed of by will without her consent/~
And finally:

''With that conclusion it follows that the interest
which the wife takes under section 282 6 is not sub·
ject to the inheritance tax * + *~u
(Emphasis added.)
The concurring opinion of Frick, J. emphasizes that
"Wife•s right under section 2 82 6 is con tin gent only upon her
surviving her husband; is not limited to such real estate
as the husband dies seized of, but extends to all the legal
and equitable estate in real property possessed by her hus ..
band at any time during the marriage and to which the
wife has made no relinquishment of her right; she takes her
full interest, although the hush a.itd had fully disposed of
his interest during his lifetime; and:

the legislature~ therefore, adopted the statute
by which a tax upon all property "which shall pass by
vrill or by the statute of inheritancet was imposed, the
wife~s interest in the husband's real estate under
section 2826 was) manifestly, not included in view
of the terms of the statute~~'
'~When

(Emphasis added.)

While the Bullen case is one that deals with the question
of inheritnace taxability of dower interests, and determines
that such dower interests are not, nor were they ever~ intended to be so taxable; the determination was made in
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particular consideration of an intestate estate. There may,
therefore be considered these matters in the light of estates
wherein wills were involved.
t

The first outstanding will case is In Re Osgood's Estate,
52 Ut. 188, 173 Pac., 152, decided in 1918r The decedenes
will provided~ in substance, all of his estate to a trusteepartial benefits therefrom to his wife-and specifically saying

~"provided,

however, that this provision for my wife shall

be in lieu oft and not in addition to~ her statutory dower
interest in my estate granted by section 2826 of the Compiled
Laws of Utah 1907 .':~

In this case the Court considered paragraphs 2826 and
1220x Comp. Laws 1907, as was done in the Bullen caset and
in addition section 2827 dealing with the election by widow
to take under will or distributive share. This latter section
is identical with the present law 74-44, U.C.A., 1953. Due
to its importance in that case~ and to show the nature of
provisions which are not duplicated in our law with respect
to deeds} its provisions are herein set forth in full.
~ '7 4-4-4.,

Election by widow to take under will or
distributive share.-If the husband shall make any
provision by will for the widow, such provision shall
be deemed to be in lieu of the distributive share
secured by the next preceding section, unless it shall
appear from the will that the decedent designed the
testamentary provisions to be additional to such dis·
tribu tive share~ If~ however~ it does not appear from
the \Vi.ll that its provision for the widow is addi tiona!,
then the \Vidow shall be conclusively presumed to
have renounced such provision and t.o have accepted
her distributive share, unless within four months after
the admission of the will to probateJ or 'Within such
additional time before distribution as the court may
allow she shall, by written instrument filed with the
clerk of the court~ accept the testamentary pro vit
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sio n ~ \Vhich acceptance shall be construed to be a
renunciation of her distributive share. In the event
that the wife shall be insane or incompetent~ or a bsent from the state, an election shall be made for
her by a general guardian. if she has one, or by a
special guardian for the purpose appointed by the

court.""
{Emphasis added.)
It appearing in that case that an intentional election,
in writng, was made for the widow by her guardian to take
under the will as construed by stipulation) and such being
in lieu of her statutory right~ the Cow1 says~ ''She of neces·
sity relinquishes her right to take under section 2826t and
thus whatever share she receives from her husband's estate
under the will passes to her by such will and not otherwise.''
In consequence"' the estate, including that property which,
but for her election, she could have received under the
provisions of section 2826, was subject to inheritance taxes.

Appellant cites this case as one in the series of cases
heretofore considered by this Court bearing upon facts and
conditions giving rise to determinations of taxability in estates on facts appearing, just as in the Bullen case there
were facts and conditions warranting non- taxa bill ty. The
cases are not similar, and each is supportable in law and in
reason on the fact situations in each appearing and the ap·
plie able laws, particularly as set out in 74-4-4, U. C .A., 1953.
The second outstanding will case is In Re Kohn~s Estate,
56 Ut. 17 ~ 189 Pac. 4 09 ~ decided in 1920. Here the court
determined and so finds "'that the widow not only intended
to and did waive her right to take under the statute~ but
elected to and did take under her husband"s will." She
served as sole executrix and distributed the estate in accordance with the terms and provisions of the wilL The
same substantial statutory provisions were considered in
this case as were considered in the Osgood case, namely
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Comp. Laws 1917 paragraph 6406 {dower) and 6407 (election
by widow to take under will or distributive share). Inheritance taxation on all property of the estate resulted.
The Court further pointed out that in this case:

"Distribution could not have been made in accordance with the provisions of the will unless the executrix elected to take under it and had waived her
statutory right., :t
We now come to the case In Re Kjar~s Estate, 62 Ut 427~
220 Pac. 501t decided in 1923. In this case it was taken as
facts that decedent conveyed by deed substantially all o£
his estate shortly prior to death and in contemplation of
death to his 'vife and children. In the determination of the
inheritance tax liability the district court permitted the administrator, over the objection of the State Tax Commission~
the deduction of an amount equal to the "Widow, s one- third

of the value of the real estate; then the appeal. In the Suw
pre me Court the validity of the objection presented the only
question to be determined~' the Supreme Court stating the
matter as follows;
"The concrete question to be determined is, was
the administrator, in the circumstances, authorized by
law to deduct from the value of the property onethird of the value of the real estate as and for the
widow"s third allowed her tinder Comp. Laws Utah
1917, paragraph 6406? And! especially, it may be
asked, was the administrator authorized to make such
deduction, where the 'Widow hersell was making no
claim on her own account under the statute referred
to, and where there is nothing,. in the record to inT

dicate that she did not join in the conveyances or
that they were made without her consent?~~
The Court determines the answer to this conerete

question:
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''It is expressly stated in the petition of the administrator that the deeds made by the deceased prior to
his death were in the nature of a final distribution
of his estate, and no doubt it \Vas so intended and
so understood, not only by the deceased~ but by his
wife and other members of the family. In the absence
of evidence to the contrary, it must be presumed that
the conveyances were made with the consent of his
wife, and that she therefore relinquished her right
to such portions of the property as were not conveyed
to herself.''
The Court distinguished the Bullen case as one where
husband died leaving real estate to which the wife had not
relinquished her right. And distinguished the Osgood case
as a 'Will case, commenting that a person claiming an exemption from the tax was charged with the burden of
proving the facts entitling him to exemption; and no such
facts were attempted to be shown.
The Court does say,. as Appellant set out:
'~Under

the inheritance tax law, conveyance by
deed stands upon the same footing as conveyance
by

will.~'

and quotes Comp. Laws Utah 1917 paragraph 3185 as amended in Sess. Laws 1919 C. 64, the prec eeding law to Section
59-12-3~ U .C.A., 1953, italicizing therefrom:

"* • * or by deed * * ~
death of the grantor

*

made in contemplation of the
~ *~'

Since this same statute at that time had the 'vords "or
intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or
after death of the grantor/' it is presumed that these words
would have been italicized had the Court found them more
apt in relation to the facts found+ In conse que nee, it is assumed that a situation where "in contemplation of death"
or '~to take effect in possession at or after death'~ would be
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treated the same.
The Kjar case was decided with no brief filed by the
respondent, in other words, without either the widow or the
admirustrator actively controverting the attempted appeal.
This is wholly understandable in view of the facts that ap·
parently the deeds included both the widow and children
as grantees and from ought that appears, they were in possession of the property prior to the death of the grantor!
and a claim of dower would be at the expense of children
named in the deeds.

Since this is the case Appellant contends is indistinguish.
able from the Malan case~ and controlling, it behooves Re ..
spondent to make the distinguisbment as follows:
Kjar's

Malan~s:

1.

Deed conveyance made
prior to death of wife and
children.

Deed conveyances made prior
to death to wife.

2.

Made in contemplation of

Made to take effect at or after death~ but whether in con-

death.

templation of death

undet~

mined.
3..

An apparent inter vivos
transfer~

Conveyances made by grant~
or, delivery by him to son,
with instructions to record
after death of grantor.

4. Administrator originally
seeking tax determination exclucling dower in·

The widow originally seeking

tax determination excluding
dower interest

terest .
5+

Administrator~ as respondent on appealt apparently unresisting effort of

The widow) as respondent on
appeal~ vigorously resisting
effort of State Tax Co mmis-
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State Tax Commission to
assess tax on

~~Dower t'

in-

sion to assess tax on dower
interest

terest
6.

~ 'lVidow

herself was making no claim on her own
account under the stat-

Widow

herself ts malting
claim on her own account
under the statute (R. 2).

ute."
7.

Nothing in the record to

The record shows conclusive-

indicate that she did not
join in the conveyances.~'

ly widow did not join in the
conveyances (R. 7, 8, and 9}.

(I

WhUe the Court says, '"'in the absence of evidence to
the contraty it must be presumed that the conveyances
were made with the consent of his wife, and that she therefore relinquished her right to such portions of the property
1

as were not conveyed to hers elf,~' such in no way says, nor
inferst that even

in the case of consent of his wife~ such con-

stitutes a relinquishment to such portions of the property
as \vere conveyed to herself .

The K jar case presents difficulty in as much as it appears
that the decision to permit taxation was, in effect~ uncontested~ and no effort was apparently made to infonn the
Court of those reasons why taxation should not be made. The
case is not controlling in the Malan case~ the factual situation
being differentt and the expressed fact premises for the conclusion reached in the K jar case being diametrically opposite
those in the Malan case.

The deeds of :Mr. Malan to his wife undoubtedly con~
veyed to her the title and interest which he had a legal right
to convey+ He could not give her more. He could not convey
to his mfe her inchoate dower interest, the law gave her
thls on Mr. Malan's acquisition of the real property during
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their coverture . On Mrr Malan's death that inchoate dower
interest of Mrs_ Malan ripened and was absolute.
In this case there is and has been no question that inheri..
tance taxes became owed on two-thirds in value of all of Mr.
Malan's real property~ and on other taxable property, the
tax being $702.42, and such has been paid.
It is not reasonable ior the State Tax Commission to
contend that the inheritance taxes accrued upon the dower
interest of Mrs. Malan when it is obvious that such interest
of Mrs . Malan did not pass to her by deedt but passed to her~
or was hers, under the law.
This does not do violence to the provisions of 59-12-3,
U~C.A.~ 1953, whereunder the method of determining gross
estate is set worth. Such requires inclusion of "* * * property t

real or personal~
deed * * *'t~

* * * which shall pass to any person * * ~ by

A real violence to the laws of this State would be done
were it possible that a woman's dower interest be taxed
upon the death of her husband in clear and plain disregard
of the law provisions 74-4-3, U +C~A+~ 1953, and in the light of
the cases all cited herein recognizing the subsistence of the
dower statute. The two will ca.s es cited recognize the dower
statute and find~ and in accord a nee with the provisions of
that statute, that a relinq uishrnent by the wife was made;
in one by the wife's guardian, the other by herself in administering and in distributing in accordance with the will. The
Kja.r case is obviously a case not applicable or comparable
factually to the Malan case, and decided, it appears~ without
contest, and certainly without due consideration being made
of the provisions of our dower statute,. the gross estate stat·
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ute, nor the statutes of fraud. The Will cases and the determinations made therein are aided, or per haps it would be
more accurate to say are controlled, by the special statute
dealing with election by widow to take under will or distributive share~ but there is no correlative statute requiring that
a \Vife taking under a deed~such legal rightt title and interest as a husband can convey by such process-must surrender, and give up, and it must be interpreted as a relinquishment by her of her statutory dower interest. Absent
such a statute there seems no legalJ equitable or statutory
reason for depriving a widow of her dower rights and of all
the emoluments thereof. There is no reason why the receipt
of such title as~ under our la\vs~ is possessed by a husband,
by a wife or widow, should operate to deprive a wife or widow of the right in real property the law itself set up for her~

Appellant suggests the widow is taking an inconsistent
position claiming through the deeds to get the entire amount
of the property whereas she would~ under the laws of sue . .
cessiont be entitled to but one-third or one-half of the husband ~s property; yet for inheritance tax purposes refusing
to recognize the deeds or gift and attempting to take by
do\ver Appellant suggests there is an estoppel.
+

It is apparent Appellant misunderstands Respondent's
position~specially does she not claim through the deeds
to get the entire amount of the property~
Respondent does claim under the deeds all of the right,
title and interest in the property her husband had a legal
right to convey~ subject to the inheritance taxes resulting
thereon. Respondent does claim under the dower statute all
of the right~ title and interest in the property such statute
affords her, together with all of the emoluments thereoft
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including the right to freedom from inheritance taxes on
the property so hers under the statute. There is no more
overlapping or inconsistency in these claims than there is in
the simple equation of % plus Va equals 3,./3.
There is no attempt to acquiesce in and enjoy the bene.
fits of a transaction and at the same time reject the accom·
panying burdens, as is specific ally stated in 19 Am. Jur.
Estoppel) Sec. 21 ~ nor to claim under an instrument without
confirming it as further provided in said citation. We~ therefore~ fail to see an estoppel in this case.

A dower interest is an interest in real property~ In this
case the wid ow did not join in the conveyance to herseH
(R~ 7 ~ 8~ and 9). The deeds were delivered by the grantor to
his son for recording subsequent to the death of the grantor,
and pursuant thereto such deeds were recorded (R. 3~ 7,8~
and 9).

Has the widow made any relinquishment of her dower
rights? The Statute of frauds too has applicability in the determination of this question.
4='25-5 .. 1. Estate or interest in real property.-No
estate or interest in real property~ other than leases
for a term not exceeding one year~ nor any trust ot
power over or cone erning real property or in any
manner relating thereto, shall be created, grantedt
assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than by
act or opration of law~ or by deed or conveyance in
writing subscribed by the party creating~ granting~
assigning~ surrendering or declaring the same, or by
his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing.'~
(Emphasis added.)

It seems apparent to the writer that the decedent owned
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real properties in his lifetime; made conveyances to his wife:t
as the facts disclose; died; his 'Wife survived; his son recorded the deeds; and his wife has made no relinquishment of
dower rights; nor have her rights been deprived her by act
or operation of law.

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully urged that this Honorable Court deter·
mine the question submitted in this appeal, and having done
so, affirm the Judgment and Decree of the lower court.

Respectfully submittedt

DAVID K. HOLTHER,

Attorney for Respondent,
Elfreda

A~

Malan.
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